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Link failures in supply networks can have catastrophic consequences that can lead to a complete
collapse of the network. Strategies to prevent failure spreading are thus heavily sought after. Here,
we make use of a spanning tree formulation of link failures in linear flow networks to analyse
topological structures that prevent failures spreading. In particular, we exploit a result obtained for
resistor networks based on the Matrix tree theorem to analyse failure spreading after link failures in
power grids. Using a spanning tree formulation of link failures, we analyse three strategies based
on the network topology that allow to reduce the impact of single link failures. All our strategies
do not reduce the grid’s ability to transport flow or do in fact improve it - in contrast to traditional
containment strategies based on lowering network connectivity. Our results also explain why certain
connectivity features completely suppress any failure spreading as reported in recent publications.
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version
may no longer be accessible.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of linear flow networks provides a powerful
framework, allowing to study systems ranging from water
supply networks [1, 2] and biological networks, such as
leaf venation networks [3–5], to resistor networks [6–8],
or AC power grids [9, 10]. Failures of transportation links
in these networks can have catastrophic consequences up
to a complete collapse of the network. As a result, link
failures in linear flow networks and their prevention are
a field of active study [11–17].
The study of linear flow networks is intimately related
to graph theory since most phenomena can be analysed
on purely topological grounds [6]. This connection dates
back to work by Kirchhoff [7] who analysed resistor net-
works, and introduced several major tools that are now
the basis of the theory of complex networks, such as the
matrix tree theorem [6, 7, 18]. These tools can now serve
as a basis for the analysis of failure spreading in AC
power grids, which can be modelled as linear flow net-
works based on the DC approximation [10]. A substan-
tial part of security analysis in power grids is dedicated
to the study of transmission line outages since they can
lead to cascading outages in a series of failures [19–21].
The topological approach to failure spreading has been
exploited to demonstrate that the strength of flow rerout-
ing after link failures decays with distance to the failing
link [11–14]. In particular, the so-called rerouting dis-
tance based on cycles in the network has been found to
predict flow rerouting very well [11]. However, the anal-
ysis of flow rerouting still lacks a theoretical foundation.
Here, we demonstrate that these observations made for
flow rerouting may be understood based on a formalism
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originally developed to study current flows in resistor net-
works that uses spanning trees (STs) of the underlying
graph. Moreover, the formalism explains recent results
regarding the shielding against failure spreading in com-
plex networks.
This publication is structured as follows; in the first
section, we give an overview over the theory of linear
flow networks and present an important lemma that re-
lates the current flows in these networks to STs. In the
next section, we demonstrate the analogy between such
networks and AC power grids in the DC approximation
and relate the ST formulation to line outages studied in
power system security analysis. Finally, we show how
this formulation may be used to understand why certain
connectivity features inhibit failure spreading extending
on recent results [22].
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF RESISTOR
NETWORKS
Resistor networks are a prime example of linear flow
networks and have inspired research throughout cen-
turies [6, 7, 24]. A resistor network can be described
using a graph as follows; let G = (E, V ) be a connected
graph with vertex set V = {v1, ...vN} and M edges in
the edge set E. Then we assign a weight wk to each edge
ek = (a, b) in the graph given by the inverse resistance
wk = R
−1
k between its terminal vertices a and b. If there
is a potential difference vk = Va − Vb between the termi-
nal vertices of edge ek = (a, b), according to Ohm’s law
there is a current flow ik between the two vertices given
by
ik =
vk
Rk
=
Va − Vb
Rk
. (1)
In order to give a direction to the current flow, we assign
an arbitrary orientation to each edge in the graph that is
encoded by the graph’s edge-node-incidence matrix B ∈
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Figure 1: Different methods for mitigating failure spreading in linear flow networks. (a) The failure of a single link
(red) with unit flow results in flow changes ∆F (color code) throughout the Scandinavian power grid. (b) Failure
spreading to Finland may be reduced by strengthening a link that horizontally separates Sweden and Finland. (c)
Adding nodes, thus increasing the length of the rerouting path, reduces failure spreading to Finland as well. (d)
Adding two links to construct a network isolator results in a complete vanishing of flow changes in the other part of
the grid. Grid topology was extracted from the open energy system model PyPSA-Eur [23].
RN×M defined as [6]
Bn,` =
 1 if line ` starts at node n,−1 if line ` ends at node n,0 otherwise. (2)
The current flows and voltages are then subject to Kirch-
hoff’s circuit laws [7]. The first of the laws, typically re-
ferred to as Kirchhoff’s current law, at an arbitrary node
j ∈ V (G) reads as
M∑
ek∈Λ(j)
ik = Ij .
Here, Ij ∈ R is the current injected into node j and
Λ(j) ⊂ E(G) is the set of all edges the connect to node
j respecting their orientation. The current law may be
regarded as a continuity equation and thus states that
the inflows and outflows at each node in the network have
to balance with the current injections at the respective
node. It may be written more compactly making use of
the node-edge-incidence matrix
Bi = I, (3)
where i = (i1, ..., iM )> ∈ RM is a vector of current flows
and I = (I1, ..., IN )> ∈ RN a vector of current injections.
On the other hand, we can also introduce a more com-
pact notation for Ohm’s law (1) by defining a vector of
nodal voltage levels V = (V1, ..., VN )> ∈ RN and a diag-
onal matrix of edge resistances R = diag(R1, ..., RM ) ∈
RM×M such that Ohm’s law reads as
Ri = B>V. (4)
Combining Ohm’s law with Kirchhoff’s current law, we
arrive at the following relationship between nodal volt-
ages V and nodal current injections I
I = BR−1B>V. (5)
This Poisson-like equation has been analysed in different
contexts [6, 11, 25]. Note that Kirchhoff’s voltage law is
automatically satisfied by virtue of equation (3), because
the resulting vector of potential differences v = BTV
vanishes along any closed cycle due to the duality be-
tween the graph’s cycle space and its cut space [6, 26].
In addition to that, the potential at one node may be
chosen freely without affecting the result.
The matrix connecting the two quantities is referred
to as weighted graph Laplacian or Kirchhoff matrix
L = BR−1B> ∈ RN×N and characterises the underlying
graph completely. It has the following entries [6]
Lmn =
{∑
`∈Λ(m) w` if m = n;
−w` if m is connected to n by `.
(6)
For a connected graph, this matrix has exactly one zero
eigenvalue λ1 = 0 with corresponding unit eigenvector
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Figure 2: Flow changes decay exponentially with cyclic paths in different networks. (a,d) Number of STs τ(G/p) in
an Erdős-Rényi (ER) random graph G(200, 300) with 300 edges and 200 vertices (a) and in the power flow test case
’IEEE 118’ [27] (d) that contain a randomly chosen cyclic path p (y-axis) plotted against the length of the path
len(p) (x-axis). The number of STs decays exponentially with the length of the path, thus appearing linear on a
logarithmic y-scale. (b,e) The rerouting distance scales exponentially with the LODF evaluated here for a single
trigger for both grids. (c,f) The exponential scaling is preserved when averaging over all possible trigger links.
Shading indicates 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles, line represents median.
v1 = 1/
√
N such that L1 = 0. For this reason, the
matrix is non-invertible. This is typically overcome by
making use of the graph’s Moore-Penrose-pseudoinverse
L† which has properties similar to the actual inverse [28].
With this formalism at hand, we can in principle now
determine the current on any edge given a particular in-
jection pattern I and edge resistances R. As a start,
consider the situation where each edge has a unit resis-
tance R = diag(1) and a unit current is injected into a
particular vertex s and withdrawn at another one t such
that I = es−et, where ei = (0, ..., 1︸︷︷︸
i
, ..., 0)> ∈ {0, 1}M
are the unit vectors with entry one at position i and zero
otherwise. In this situation, the current across any edge
in the graph ` = (a, b) is given by the following lemma
which dates back to Kirchhoff [7, 18] and has been pop-
ularised by Shapiro [6, 29].
Lemma 1. Put a one-ampere current between the ver-
tices s and t of a connected, unweighted graph G such
that I = es − et. Then the current on any other edge
(a, b) is given by
iab =
N (s, a→ b, t)−N (s, b→ a, t)
N ,
where N (s, a → b, t) is the number of STs that contain
a path from s to t of the form s, . . . , a, b, . . . , t and N is
the total number of STs of the graph.
Whereas this lemma only holds for graphs where all
links have unit resistances, real-world resistor networks or
other types of linear flow networks are typically weighted
with non-homogeneous resistances. However, the ex-
tension to weighted networks is straightforward as sum-
marised in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Put a one-ampere current between the ver-
tices s and t of a connected, weighted graph G such that
I = es − et. Then the current on any other edge (a, b) is
given by
iab =
N ∗(s, a→ b, t)−N ∗(s, b→ a, t)
N ∗ , (7)
where N ∗ =∑T∈T ∏e∈T we is the sum over the products
of the weights we of all edges e ∈ T that are part of the
4respective spanning tree T and T is the set of all STs
in the graph. We thus assign a weight to each ST given
by the product of the weights of the edges on the ST and
replace the unweighted STs in Lemma 1 by weighted STs.
We will demonstrate in the following sections how this
lemma and corollary may be made use of to understand
how failure spreading may be mitigated in linear flow net-
works such as AC power grids in the DC approximation.
III. ANALOGY BETWEEN RESISTOR
NETWORKS AND POWER FLOW IN
ELECTRICAL GRIDS
Importantly, the theoretical framework developed in
the last section may not only be applied to resistor net-
works. In this section, we demonstrate how these results
may be used to gain insight into the mitigation of failure
spreading in power grids.
A. Modelling power grids as linear flow networks
Most electric power transmission grids are made up of
AC transmission lines and are as such governed by the
non-linear AC power flow equations [10]. However, the
real power flow over transmission lines can be simplified
to a linear flow model in what is referred to as the DC ap-
proximation of the AC power flow. This approximation
is based on the following assumptions:
• Nodal voltages vary little.
• Transmission lines are purely inductive, i.e. their
resistance is negligible compared to their reactance
r`  x`, ∀` ∈ E(G).
• Differences between nodal voltage angles ϑn, n ∈
V (G) of neighbouring nodes n,m are small ϑn −
ϑm  1.
Typically, these assumptions are met if the power grid is
not heavily loaded [30]. As a result, the real power flow
F` along a transmission line e` = (n,m) ∈ E(G) in the
DC approximation depends linearly on the nodal voltage
phase angles ϑn of neighbouring nodes
F` = b`(ϑn − ϑm). (8)
Here b` ≈ x−1` is the line susceptance of line `. Thus, the
vector of real power flow along the transmission lines in
the power grid F = (F1, ..., FM )> ∈ RM takes the role
of current flow vector in the case of resistor networks.
On the other hand, the nodal voltage phase angles ϑ =
(ϑ1, ..., ϑN )
> ∈ RN take the role of the nodal voltages V
and line weights are given by the line susceptances bk of
an edge ek in correspondence with the inverse resistances
r−1k in the case of resistor networks. Thus, Ohm’s law (4)
translates to power grids as
F = BdB
>ϑ.
Table I: Analogy between resistor networks and AC power grids
in the DC approximation.
DC approximation Resistor network
Power injections P Nodal current I
Real power flow F Current flow i
Nodal phase angles ϑ Nodal Voltages V
Line susceptances be Inverse edge resistance r−1e
Here, Bd = diag(b1, ..., bM ) ∈ RM×M is the diagonal
matrix of line susceptances. Again, Kirchhoff’s current
law (3) holds and we may express it using vector quanti-
ties as follows [10, 11]
BF = P.
Here, P = (P1, ..., PN )> ∈ RN is the vector of nodal
power injections which thus takes the role of nodal cur-
rent injections I. We summarise these equivalences in
Table I.
B. Sensitivity factors in power grid security
analysis
In power grids security analysis, linear sensitivity
factors are used to study and prevent line overloads
which would prevent the power grids from running prop-
erly [10]. One of these factors is the Power Transfer Dis-
tribution Factor (PTDF). The PTDFs,t,k then quantifies
the change in flow ∆Fk on line ek ∈ E(G) if a power ∆P
is injected at node r and withdrawn from node s. It is
calculated as
PTDFr,s,k =
∆Fk
∆P
. (9)
In addition to this factor, one typically considers the Line
Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) which measures the
change in power flow on a line em when another line ek
fails [10]
LODFm,k =
∆Fm
F
(0)
k
. (10)
Here, F (0)k is the flow on line ek before the outage. Math-
ematically, these two quantities are related as follows if
ek = (r, s) is the failing link [10]
LODFm,k =
PTDFr,s,m
1− PTDFr,s,k . (11)
C. Spanning tree description of link failures
On the basis of the analogy between electrical grids
and resistor networks developed in the last sections, we
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Figure 3: Spanning trees (STs) may be used to explain the shielding effect of certain connectivity structures between
different parts of a network. (a,b) A square grid is divided into two parts by either weakening the links connecting
two parts (a, blue, we = 0.1) or strengthening the links perpendicularly separating the two parts (b, blue, we = 10).
(c,d) For both divisions, the failure of a single link with unit flow (red) significantly reduces failure spreading to the
other part of the network. (e-h) Different STs (black) that contain specific paths of the form
(v0 = r, v1, . . . , vi = m, vi+1 = n, vi+2, . . . , vk = s) used to calculate the flow changes on link (m,n) for a failure of
link (r, s) by virtue of Eq (7). (e,f) For the weakly connected network shown in panel (a,c), a monitoring link in the
same part (e) may lead to STs that contain only one weak link (blue shading). Thus, the contribution of this ST to
the sum over all STs is much stronger than for a monitoring link in the other part, where STs have to contain at
least two weak links (f, blue shading). (g,h) For the strongly connected network shown in panel (g,h), the STs
contributing highest are the ones containing all edges with strong weights (g, blue shading). (h) If links (m,n) and
(r, s) are in different parts, no ST may contain all edges with strong weights (blue shading), thus reducing failure
spreading in this case.
will now show how the ST formula presented in Lemma 1
may be used for power systems security analysis. In the
language of power grids, the lemma yields the PTDFs,t,m
for an edge em = (a, b) if a unit power ∆P is injected at
node r and withdrawn from node s. For this reason, the
PTDF may be calculated as follows
PTDFs,t,m =
N ∗(s, a→ b, t)−N ∗(s, b→ a, t)
N ∗ . (12)
Based on Eq. (11) which yields the LODF expressed in
terms of the PTDF, we can make use of this expression
to derive an equivalent expression for the LODF. If ek =
(r, s) is the failing link and em = (a, b) the link where
the flow changes are monitored, the expression based on
Eq. (12) reads as
LODFm,k =
N ∗(r, a→ b, s)−N ∗(r, b→ a, s)
N ∗ − (N ∗(r, r → s, s)−N ∗(r, s→ r, s))
=
N ∗(r, a→ b, s)−N ∗(r, b→ a, s)
N ∗ −N ∗(r, r → s, s)
=
N ∗(r, a→ b, s)−N ∗(r, b→ a, s)
N ∗\{k}
. (13)
Here, N ∗\{k} denotes the weight of all STs in the graph
evaluated after removing the edge ek. We thus found an
expression for the LODFs that is based purely on certain
STs in the graph. This equation is the basis of our anal-
ysis of subgraphs inhibiting failure spreading which we
will perform in the following sections. Note that a simi-
lar expression for the LODFs based on spanning 2-forests
has recently been derived by Guo et al. [15].
6IV. MITIGATING FAILURE SPREADING
We have seen in the last section that the spreading of
failures is studied using LODFs in power systems security
analysis. To prevent large flow changes on other links af-
ter the failure of a link ek which may potentially trigger
dangerous cascades of failures, it is desirable for overall
power system security to keep the LODFs small. A nat-
ural question to ask is thus: Can we design or alter the
network topology in such a way that LODFs stay small?
Based on Equation (13) expressing the LODF in terms
of STs, this question may be addressed in a purely topo-
logical manner. In particular, we deduce three strategies
to reduce the effect of failure spreading
1. Fixing long paths between trigger link ek and mon-
itoring link el leaves only few degrees of freedom
which reduces the relative contribution of the nu-
merator in Eq. (13)
2. Fixing specific paths between trigger link ek and
monitoring link el can force links of large weights
to be not contained in the numerator, thus reducing
its relative contribution to Eq. (13)
3. Introducing symmetric elements between parts of
the network may lead to a complete balancing be-
tween the two contributions in the numerator of
Eq. (13)
We will address each of the strategies in the following
subsections.
A. The role of the rerouting distance
With Eq. (13) expressing LODFs using STs at hand
it is intuitively clear that certain paths in the network
should play an important role in predicting the overall
effect of line outages. In particular, we can see immedi-
ately that for a given failing link ek, the numerator in
Eq. (13) depends on the paths going through the link
monitoring the flow changes el whereas the denominator
does not. Therefore, we expect the flow changes to be
smaller on another link em that has a longer minimum
path going through em and ek compared to link el. This
is due to the fact that reducing the number of possible
path in the sum over all STs N ∗(r, a → b, s) effectively
reduces the number of STs by fixing a certain path.
This intuitive idea is demonstrated to hold also quan-
titatively in Figure 2,a,d: We illustrate that the number
of STs τ(G/p) scales approximately exponentially with
the length of the cyclic path contained in the STs for an
unweighted Erdős-Rényi (ER) random graph G(200, 300)
with 300 edges and 200 vertices [31] (a) and the power
flow test case ’IEEE 118’ [27, 32] (d). To study this scal-
ing, we contract a cyclic path p between two arbitrarily
chosen edges and quantify the number of STs using Kirch-
hoff’s matrix tree theorem [7]. The theorem states that
the number of STs in a graph may be calculated using
the determinant of the graph’s Laplacian matrix
τ(G) = det(Lu).
Here, Lu is the matrix obtained from the Laplacian ma-
trix L of G obtained by removing row and column cor-
responding to an arbitrarily chosen vertex u ∈ V (G).
The number of STs τ(G/p) containing a path p may be
calculated by contracting the path in the graph and the
Laplacian matrix and then taking the determinant of the
resulting Laplacian. Taking the difference in the numer-
ator of Eq. (13) between the path and a reversed path
will in general not affect the exponential scaling since the
difference of two exponentials with different exponents or
different prefactors will again scale exponentially.
We may thus expect an exponential decay of LODFs
with the length of fixed, cyclic paths. This result com-
plements recent progress made in the understanding of
the role played by distance for failure spreading in lin-
ear flow networks. In Ref. [11], it was shown that flow
changes after a link failure are not captured well by the
ordinary graph distance between the failing link and the
link monitoring flow changes. Instead, a different dis-
tance measure referred to as rerouting distance captures
this effect much better. It is defined as follows;
Definition 1. A rerouting path from vertex r to vertex
s via the edge (m,n) is a path
(v0 = r, v1, . . . , vi = m, vi+1 = n, vi+2, . . . , vk = s)
or
(v0 = r, v1, . . . , vi = n, vi+1 = m, vi+2, . . . , vk = s)
where no vertex is visited twice. The rerouting distance
between two edges (r, s) and (m,n) denoted by
edistre[(r, s), (m,n)]
is the length of the shortest rerouting path from r to s via
(m,n) plus the length of edge (r, s). Equivalently, it is
the length of the shortest cycle crossing both edges (r, s)
and (m,n). If no such path exists, the rerouting distance
is defined to be ∞.
The rerouting distance defined this way is a proper dis-
tance metric. With the arguments made before at hand
it is intuitively clear why the rerouting distance performs
very well in predicting the effects of line outages. Indeed,
we observe an exponential scaling of the LODFs for a
given trigger link in the ER random graph Figure 2,b
and in the test case ’IEEE 118’ (e).
B. The role of strong and weak network
connectivity
Our second strategy to reduce failure spreading af-
ter link failures is based on fixing specific paths in the
7Figure 4: Network isolators that lead to a complete vanishing of LODFs are created using certain symmetric paths
in the network. (a) STs that contain a path starting at node r and terminating at node s and containing the edge
(m,n) (blue) or (n,m) (red) have to cross the subgraph consisting of dotted, coloured edges in the centre. Since
each path can contain each vertex and edge only once, each ST passing through the subgraph in one way (blue) has
a counterpart passing through the subgraph in the other way (red). (b) Failure of a link (red) results in vanishing
LODFs (colour code) in the part connected by a network isolator as predicted using the ST formulation of link
failures.
network in such a way that they cannot contain cer-
tain links with large weights. This way, the numera-
tor in Equation (13) does not contain the contribution
of the links with large weights whereas the denominator
does, thereby reducing the overall impact of the link fail-
ure. Note that in contrast to the last section, the fixed
paths do not necessarily have to be long to prevent fail-
ure spreading. We will demonstrate this strategy for two
cases: First, we use this reasoning to demonstrate that
weakening the links between two parts of the network –
thus effectively dividing it into communities – may re-
duce failure spreading between them. This is expected
as weakly connected networks generally suppress failure
spreading from one part to the other one, but this also
limits the possibility of power flow between the parts.
This is no longer true for the second strategy: we illus-
trate why also strengthening the links that separate two
parts of the network horizontally reduces the impact of
link failures.
The two strategies are illustrated for a simple 3 × 6
square grid in Figure 3. The failure of a link ek =
(r, s) (dotted, orange) leads to different contribution of
the numerator in Equation (13) if the monitoring link
e` = (m,n) (green) is contained in the same part (e) as
compared to a different, weakly connected part (f) in an
otherwise symmetrical situation. Note that the distance
between monitoring link and trigger link is also the same
in both, panels e and f. For a link in the same part, the
numerator also contributes with STs containing only one
weak link (thin line, blue shading). For a trigger link
located in the other part, each ST connecting trigger has
to contain at least two weak links (shaded blue). Since
the contribution in the numerator is proportional to the
product of all weights along the ST and the situation
is otherwise symmetric, we expect a weaker LODF and
thus a shielding effect if the two links are contained in
different, weakly connected parts.
In panels (b) and (d), we demonstrate that strong,
horizontal connections have a similar effect on failure
spreading: If the monitoring link e` = (m,n) is con-
tained in the same part of the network as the trigger link
ek = (r, s) (g), now separated through strong connec-
tions, spanning trees connecting the two links may con-
tain two – or generally: all – strong links. For a trigger
link in the other part of the network, the spanning tree
connecting them can contain maximally one – or gener-
ally: all minus one – strong links. Again, the term in the
numerator scales with the link weights contained in the
spanning trees. Therefore, we expect the effect of link
failures to be stronger for links located in the same part
as compared to links contained in the other part which
is confirmed when simulating the failure of a single link
in panel (d).
C. The role of symmetry
As a third strategy for reducing failure spreading, we
suggest building networks in such a way that the terms
in the numerator of Equation (13) balance. In this case,
failure spreading reduces to zero for the respective links.
In order to balance the terms in the numerator of Equa-
tion (13), we need the spanning trees passing through
the monitoring link e` = (a, b) in both directions to have
exactly the same weight
N ∗(r,m→ n, s) = N ∗(r, n→ m, s)
⇒
∑
T∈T (r,m→n,s)
∏
e∈T
we =
∑
T∈T (r,n→m,s)
∏
e∈T
we.
Here, T (r,m→ n, s) is the set of all spanning trees con-
taining a path of the form (r, ...,m, n, ..., s). This equality
8is for example fulfilled if for each tree T ∈ T (r,m→ n, s)
there is a counterpart T ∈ T (r, n → m, s) of the same
weight. This may be accomplished by introducing cer-
tain symmetric elements, referred to as network isola-
tors [22], into the graph as demonstrated in Figure 4:
For each ST connecting trigger link ek = (r, s) and mon-
itoring link e` = (m,n) and containing a path of the
form (r, ...,m, n, ..., s) (grey and blue lines) there is an
ST containing a path of the form (r, ..., n,m, ..., s) (grey
and red lines). If we compare the product of weights for
a single tree T0 ∈ T (r,m → n, s) and its counterpart
T ∗0 ∈ T (r, n→ m, s), such that both contain exactly the
same edges except for the edges connecting the two parts,
i.e., the links marked as blue and red arrows in Figure 4,
we can see that these products are equal except for the
links r1 and r2 (red links) being contained only in T0,
and b1 and b2 (blue links) being contained only in T ∗0 .
We can thus conclude that the above equality is fulfilled,
i.e., the product of weights is equal for both trees T0 and
T ∗0 , if
b1 · b2 = r1 · r2.
In this case, a failure of link ek = (r, s) does not result in
any flow changes on link e` = (m,n) at all. This reason-
ing has been generalised recently, where the concept was
termed network isolators [22]. We also note that similar
arguments were put forward by Guo et al [15]. On gen-
eral grounds, network isolators are defined as follows [22]
Lemma 2. Consider a linear flow network consisting of
two parts with vertex sets V1 and V2 and assume that
a single link in the induced subgraph G(V1) fails, i.e. a
link (r, s) with r, s ∈ V1. If the adjacency matrix of the
mutual connections has unit rank rank(A12) = 1, then
the flows on all links in the induced subgraph G(V2) are
not affected by the failure, that is
∆Fm,n ≡ 0 ∀m,n ∈ V2.
The subgraph corresponding to the mutual interactions is
referred to as network isolator.
Note that network isolators of arbitrary size may be
understood using the same reasoning as presented above
for a network isolator consisting of only four links.
1. Sign reversal of flow changes
Based on the symmetric elements – the network iso-
lators – introduced in the last section, we can demon-
strate yet another application of the ST formulation of
link failures: We can modify the grid in such a way that
the LODFs and thus the flow changes change their sign.
This is again based on the symmetry of LODFs in terms
of the paths (r, ...,m, n, ..., s) and (r, ..., n,m, ..., s). If
we apply a symmetric modification such that paths of
the first form are replaced by parts of the latter one, we
can reverse the sign of the resulting flow changes. In
Figure 5: Sign reversal of LODFs by symmetric
subgraphs. (a,b) Modifying the subgraph connecting
two graphs from the two parallel lines to the two
crossing lines leads to a sign reversal of the LODFs in
the connecting subgraphs (shades of grey). This is in
line with the compensatory effect of the symmetric
subgraphs used to create network isolator in Figure 4.
particular, if we interchange the two terms appearing in
the nominator of Eq.(13= for a subset of edges, we can
change the sign of the LODF for these edges
N ∗(r,m→ n, s)→ N ∗(r, n→ m, s)
N ∗(r, n→ m, s)→ N ∗(r,m→ n, s)
⇒ LODF`,k → −LODF`,k.
This can achieved using a modification similar to the one
shown in Fig. 4,a: If the initial network contains the sub-
graph indicated by dotted, blue arrows in the centre, we
can revert the sign of the LODF`,k by changing this sub-
graph to the one indicated by red, dotted arrows. This is
demonstrated in Figure 5: Changing the subgraph in the
centre connecting the two graphs from the "x"-shaped
subgraph (a) to the "="-shaped subgraph (b) leads to a
sign reversal of the LODFs in the second graph (shades
of grey) while the magnitude of LODFs is the same in
both panels. This modifications thus allows to simulate-
nously change the sign of all LODFs in a subgraph which
may prevent overloads that are caused by flows going in
a particular direction.
V. CONCLUSION
We demonstrated how a spanning tree formulation of
link failures may be used to understand which topolog-
ical patterns aid the mitigation of failure spreading in
power grids and other types of linear flow networks. In
particular, we derived and explained three strategies for
reducing the effect of link failures in linear flow networks
based on spanning trees. Our results offer a new un-
derstanding of previous strategies used to inhibit failure
spreading in power grids and may thus help increasing
power grid security.
All strategies analysed here for reducing failure spread-
ing are based on extending – or at least not reducing – the
9network’s ability to transport flows. This is in contrast
to typical containment strategies in power grid security
which are based on islanding the power grid, i.e. reducing
the connectivity for the sake of security. We illustrated
how to exploit the intimate connection to graph theory to
find and analyse subgraphs that allow for improving both
power grid resilience and efficiency at the same time.
Our results offer a new understanding on a graph-
theoretical level of network structures that have been
found to inhibit or enhance failure spreading. We illus-
trated the fruitful approach of analysing failure spread-
ing in power grids by using spanning trees for several
subgraphs but are confident that other subgraphs for en-
hancing or inhibiting failure spreading may be unveiled
using this formalism.
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